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THE USE OF MANDAMUS TO REVIEW REFERENCES
TO SPECIAL MASTERS
RULE 53 OF THE FEDERAL RULES of Civil Procedure authorizes dis-
trict court judges, in appropriate circumstances, to refer the whole or
any part of a case for hearing before a master.1 It is obvious that a
proper reference is likely to achieve quite desirable ends.' For example,
the master usually has special competence in the type of litigation re-
ferred. In addition, the informality of the proceedings makes trial
preparation less arduous and facilitates the disposition of complex issues.
On the other hand, however, there are also obvious disadvantages in
the use of a master, the most burdensome of which are the increases in
trial cost and trial time that invariably attend a reference.3 Accordingly,
orders of reference are often resisted by at least one party to the litiga-
tion 4
Any attempt to review immediately an order of reference, however,
is complicated by the fact that only certain interlocutory orders issued
'In general, the rule provides that each district court "may appoint one or more
standing masters for its district, and the court in which any action is pending may
appoint a special master therein." The rule also indicates broadly the circumstances
which will justify reference to a special master [see note i6 infra], and prescribes the
powers with which such masters shall be invested. See Dobie, The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. z61, 291-93 (939) ; Strichartz, Masters and Their
Fees, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 403 (-949).
'It has been suggested that reference to a special master is most appropriate in
actions involving complicated issues of a specialized or technical nature. See Yank-
wich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 4.1, 57, 79-81 (951); Comment, 59
YALE L.J. 117, 132-34 (x949). Accordingly, masters have been utilized in actions
for patent infringement to determine complex issues, Skinner v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 95 F. Supp. 183, 184 (W.D. Pa. 295i), or to ascertain damages, Modern
Art Printing Co. v. Skeels, x23 F. Supp. 426 (D.N.J. 1954.). Cf. Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Dictograph Products Co., 6 F.R.D. 597, 599 (D.Del. 1947). Similarly, refer-
ences have been made to determine the amount of unpaid wages and overtime under the
Fair Labor Standards Act. Harrington v. Empire Construction Co., 71 F. Supp. 324
(D. Md. 1947).
'See Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, tP F.zd 8o9, 8i 5 ( 7 th
Cir. 1942): "It is a matter of common knowledge that references greatly increase the
cost of litigation and delay and postpone the end of litigation." Cf. Los Angeles
Brush Mfg. Co. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 707 (1927).
'See, e.g., Slatcoff v. Dezen, 74 So.zd 59 (Fla. 1954), noted in 9 MIAMI L.Q.
361 (1955).
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in the federal courts are appealable.5 Because of the final judgment
rule," review of other orders may be had only through one of the
extraordinary writs.7 Recently, the Supreme Court has granted cer-
tiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for review of a
decision which involves the use of the writ of mandamus to obtain re-
view of orders of reference to a special master. In Howes Leather Co.
v. LaBay,8 petitioners, defendants in an antitrust action which was re-
ferred to a master, sought a writ of mandamus to compel District Judge
LaBuy to rescind the order of reference.' The principal reasons ad-
vanced as a basis for the reference were the element of accounting in-
volved, the congested condition of the court calendar, and the com-
plexity of the issues in the case.' 0 The court of appeals held that the
writ of mandamus should issue, concluding that the justification offered
to support the reference was so inadequate as to make the reference not
merely an erroneous decision, which should be corrected only on final
r 65 STAT. 726 (x95x), 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1952). This statutory codification of
the "final judgment rule" provides generally that four groups of interlocutory decrees
may be appealed: (i) orders of the federal district courts granting, modifying, con-
tinuing, refusing or dissolving injunctions, except where a direct review by the
Supreme Court is available; (2) orders appointing receivers or refusing to wind up
receiverships; (3) decrees determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to ad-
miralty cases; and (4) judgments in civil actions for patent infringment which are
final except for accounting.
" The final judgment rule is grounded in certain practical considerations, such as
avoidance of the delay and expense occasioned by fragmentary appeals, the achieve-
ment of uniformity and certainty of judicial administration for litigants, and the de-
sire to terminate litigation expeditiously. In addition, absent any restraints afforded
by the rule, the appellate courts might be harassed with appeals. See generally,
Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 4! YALE L.J. 539 (1932); Note,
58 YALE L.J. ix86, 1187 (1949). As to the codification of the rule by statute in
several states, see Note, 1940 Wis. L. REV. 579, 583.
'The "all writs statute," 63 STAT. 102 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 165x (1952), pro-
vides that, "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agree-
able to the usages and principles of law."
6226 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3221 (U.S. Feb.
.8, 1956) (No. 622).
9 Actually, there were two petitions for writs of mandamus which arose out of
two related actions pending before Judge LaBuy. In William Rohljlng v. Cat's Paw
Rubber Co., Civil No. 5 o-C-22 9 , N.D. Ill., tle parties had appeared before the master
prior to the filing of the petition for a writ of mandamus. In Shaffer v. United
States Rubber Co., Civil No. 5o-C-884, N.D. Ill., the petition was filed before the
master's hearing convened.
10 226 F.2d at 7o6.
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appeal, but an abuse of discretion, which could be corrected by the
issuance of the writ."
The cardinal limitation to be observed in the use of mandamus, as
well as the other extraordinary writs, is that it must not be employed
merely as a substitute for an unavailable interlocutory appeal.12 Con-
sistent with this limitation, the scope of the writ has been only cau-
tiously expanded; but, whereas originally it was available only to com-
pel the performance of ministerial functions by public officials, now it
may issue to compel an exercise of discretion or to review an abuse of
discretion. 13  Since, in the case of references to a special master, man-
damus can serve only to review abuses of discretion,14 it would seem
that the question of whether or not the writ may issue should depend
upon the egregiousness of the error committed by the lower court in
ordering the reference.
If, then, the crucial question is whether the severity of the lower
court's error amounts to an abuse of discretion, it is necessary to de-
termine within what permissible limits of discretion the court may order
a reference. Since the main function of a master is to bring a special
competence to certain types of litigation, it would seem that a reference
2 226 F.2d at 707.
1' "Mandamus is not a substitute for, and cannot be used as an appeal or writ
of error." State ex rel. Gresham v. Delaney, 213 Minn. 217, 229, 6 N.W.2d 97, 98
(1942). See also Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953);
Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, z6o (1947); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 39
U.S. 21, 27 (943); Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Ryan, z1 F.zd 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Gulf
Research and Development v. Harrison, i85 F.zd 57, 459 ( 9 th Cir. 19so); Federal
Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Reeves, 148 F.zd 731, 732 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Dilling v.
U.S., 142 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 2944).
" At common law, the writ of mandamus was a prerogative remedy, issued in the
name of the sovereign, to compel public officials or inferior courts to exercise min-
isterial or judicial powers vested in them. It subsequently evolved into a judicial
remedy, taking the form of a civil action at law. Although it remains an extraordinary
legal remedy, the propriety of its discretionary issuance is determined by general
equitable principles. See Crick, supra note 5; Note, 5o COLUM. L. REV. iO2, 12o4
(2950). As to the scope of mandamus in the federal courts, Justice Strong, in Vir-
ginia v. Rives, ioo U.S. 323, 323 (1879), opined: "[I]t may be said to be an
established remedy to oblige inferior courts and magistrates to do that justice which
they are in duty, and by virtue of their office, bound to do. It does not lie to control
judicial discretion, except when that discretion has been abused; but it is a remedy
when the case is outside of the exercise of this discretion, and outside the jurisdiction
of the court or officer to which or to whom the writ is addressed." See also, State
ex rel. Gresham v. Delaney, 213 Minn. 217, 219, 6. N.V.2d 97, 98 (294-) ; Hilmer
v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 71, 29 P.2d 175 (2934)5 Swanson v. Alworth, 159 Minn.
193 , 198 N.W. 453 (1924).
" See cases cited in note 12 supra.
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should be made only when the nature of the issues involved in a case
make it reasonably necessary to take advantage of that special compe-
tence.'5 Accordingly, Rule 53 (b) suggests that there shall be a refer-
ence only when the issues are sufficiently specialized and complex.'"
The only other guidance supplied by the rule is the admonition that a
reference "shall be the exception and not the rule," and the direction
that more exceptional conditions should be required to sustain a reference
in nonjury cases than in jury cases. In the light of these imprecise
standards, it is difficult to imagine many instances in which reference
orders could be so erroneous as to be abusive of discretion.
Perhaps one such instance occurred in McCulloch v. Cosgrave,1
where the Supreme Court, per curiam, granted mandamus to rescind
a reference order whose primary basis appeared to be the trial judge's
illness and the impatience of the parties to terminate the litigation.'"
Similarly, mandamus has been issued to compel a rescission of a refer-
ence order which was based on the practice of the district judge to refer
all cases in a certain field of law to a master.' 9 In the LaBuy case,
however, where there was an element of accounting involved,20 the
court's calendar was congested, and the trial judge found the issues
in the case to be complex, it would appear that the court of appeals'
18 See note z supra.
1" Rule 53(b) provides that, "A reference to a master shall be the exception and
not the rule. In actions to be tried by a jury, a reference shall be made only when
the issues are complicatedi in actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of
account, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condi-
tion requires it."
17 309 U.S. 634 (1940).
18 The only case cited in the per curiam opinion was Los Angeles Brush Mfg. Co.
v. James, 272 U.S. 701 (1927), wherein the district court judge, pursuant to a
practice of referring all patent cases to special masters, issued an order of reference on
the ground that the court's calendar was congested and that patent trials are lengthy.
Although the Supreme Court in the James case refused to issue a writ of mandamus,
it intimated that the presence of a congested calendar was not, in itself, an exceptional
condition within the meaning of Rule 5 3 (b) and that a reference, issued solely on
that basis, would in all probability be an abuse of discretion. z72 U.S. at 708. Cf.
Skinner v. Aluminum Co. of America, 95 F. Supp. 183, 184 (W.D. Pa. 8951).
"
9 E.g., United States v. Kirkpatrick, 186 F.zd 393 (3d Cir. 1951).
" This accounting element, however, did not constitute a "matter of account"
under Rule 5 3 (b). A liability to account must be definitely established before a
reference can be made solely on the strength of the accounting provision of Rule
53(b) 5 a potential or even probable accounting is not sufficient. Columbian Equip-
ment Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 113 Fed. 23 (sth Cir. 19oz). Even
established liability to account is not conclusive; it must be shown that the matter is
complex. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE " 53.05 (zd ed. 1953).
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issuance of mandamus was prompted by purposes other than the cor-
rection of an abuse of discretion. Rather, the decision seems to reflect
an inclination to afford an interlocutory review of reference orders
which are, at worst, erroneous, not egregiously erroneous.2'
This inclination probably stems from a recognition that, in the case
of an erroneous reference, the parties are likely to suffer considerable
hardship if the reference is not reversed until final appeal.2" But ob-
viously, any considerations of hardship to the parties are technically
irrelevant to the propriety of mandamus, since they are unrelated to
those factors which determine the magnitude of the error. 23  That
expense and prejudice are likely to occur, however, is hardly disputable.
Even in ordinary reference cases, both parties may expect a certain
amount of trial delay and are likely to be assessed a portion of the
master's fee.24 If the reference, on final appeal, is held erroneous, this
" Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has taken a liberal view with respect to the use of
mandamus to review nonappealable orders of transfer under section 14o4(a) of the
Judicial Code. 62 STAT. 937 (948), 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1952). Whereas the
first, second, and third circuits issue mandamus only in "extraordinary circumstances,"
the seventh circuit, being more disposed to review of transfer orders, does not place
an "extraordinary circumstance" limitation on the issuance of mandamus. Compare
In re Josephson, 2i8 F.2d 174 (st Cir. 1954) 5 Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, i8z F.zd
329 (2d Cir. 195o), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 851 (195o) ; and All States Freight, Inc.
v. Modarelli, 196 F.zd ioxo (3d Cir. 1952), with Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Igoe,
22o F.zd 299 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 76 Sup. Ct. 4-9 (1955). See, Kaufman,
Further Observation on Transfers Under Section z4o 4 (a), 56 COLUM. L. REV. i, 1-11
(.956).
"1See note 3 supra. Consider also the following cases: Forgay v. Conrad, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 653 (1847)5 Burgin v. Sugg, zio Ala. 142, 97 So. z6 (9z3).
"See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 US. 21, 30 (194-3): "[T]hat in-
convenience is one which we must take it Congress contemplated in providing that only
final judgments should be reviewable. Where the appeal statutes establish the condi-
tions of appellate review, an appellate court cannot rightly exercise its discretion to
issue a writ whose only effect would be to avoid those conditions and thwart the
Congressional policy against piecemeal appeals in criminal cases." Cf. United States
Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 202-03 (94-5).
"* The determination as to which party will bear the burden of the master's com-
pensation is made at the discretion of the trial court. The court may make its own
allocation or accept an agreement between counsel. The only limitation on the
court is that it act reasonably. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 259 U.S. 1o (19z2).
Therefore, the cost burden may fall on either party. See Heiberg v. Hasler, i F.R.D.
735 (E.D.N.Y. 194-1) (upon defendant who requested the reference); General Motors
Corp. v. Circulators & Devices Mfg. Corp., 67 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (upon
plaintiff at first, then taxed as part of plaintiff's cost against defendant); Los Angeles
Brush Mfg. Co. v. James, 272 U.S. 701, 707 (1927); Adventures in Good Eating v.
Best Places to Eat, 131 F.zd 809, 8i5 ( 7 th Cir. 1942). Cf. Heifer v. Corona Products,
127 F.zd 6zz, 614 (8th Cir. 1942).
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delay and expense are wasted. Furthermore, in certain cases, the cost
of an erroneous reference may be imposed on one of the parties alone.2
For example, it has been held that the expense of an erroneous reference
should be charged to the party who was instrumental in obtaining the
reference.26 In addition, the compensation for special masters is cus-
tomarily liberal,2 7 and the cases that are referred are those which
typically promise to be the most protracted.28 Yet, regardless of the
obvious relevance of these practical factors to the need for preliminary
review, there appears to be no place for their consideration in the light
of the formal principles governing the issuance of mandamus."
Admittedly, the rationale underlying both the final judgment rule
and the limitations on the use of mandamus is not to be wholly dis-
regarded. However, when this rule and these limitations are the source
of such inconvenience and prejudice to litigants that appellate courts
are constrained to pay them only lip service, a re-examination of the
need for full compliance would seem appropriate. Various proposals °
have been advanced to restrict the final judgment rule. Perhaps the
reviewability of reference orders by mandamus, dependent as it is on a
relatively unworkable 'criterion rather than on highly relevant practical
considerations, 31 illustrates the necessity that such proposals receive con-
gressional attention.
"5 See 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.04(1) (2d ed. 1951), for cases cited in
nn. 28-30.
26 Adventures in Good Eating v. Good Places to Eat, 13 1 F.2d 809 ( 7th Cir. 1942).
2In Newton v. Consolidated Gas. Co., 259 U.S. 1o, 1o5 (1922), the Supreme
Court said that a high rate of pay is necessary to secure ability and experience in an
exacting and temporary employment. A rate of ten to twenty thousand dollars a year
was said not to be too exorbitant. In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 26
F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), the master was allowed compensation at the rate of
$35 per hour, plus $250 per day for expenses; in Gold Seal Inporters v. Morris White
Fashions, 4 F.R.D. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), the master was allowed $15oo for eleven
days; and in Clair v. Kastar, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), the master was
allowed $2000 for eighty-four hours. For a thorough discussion of compensation
of a master, see 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.04 (2d ed. x95i). See also 3
MIAMI L.Q. 403, 410-13 0949).
'8 See note 2 supra.
See note 23 supra.
'0 For example: increase the number of interlocutory orders from which appeals may
be taken; vest discretion in the trial or appellate courts to grant interlocutory appeals;
provide for certified questions on interlocutory matters. See, generally, Moore and
Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35
VA. L. REv. 1, 45 (1949)5 Notes, 58 YALE L.J. xi86 (1949), 56 YALE LJ. 141
(1946). 38 MICH. L. REV. 208 (1939).
"See Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 30-I 01943).
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